This isn't a breach teardown. No breach has occurred, and nothing here should be read as claiming one has. It's a pre-incident analysis: a look at a proposed regulatory change and the potential control failures it could create if finalized as some stakeholders fear. If you're a life-sciences regulatory affairs lead whose products or partners handle patient-directed data flows, this is the failure mode to rehearse now.
The Issue at Hand
A coalition of 17 health systems, hospitals, and clinics, led by CHIME, sent a letter to HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. The subject is the pending final rule on the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Changes to Support Coordinated Care and Individual Engagement and Reduce Regulatory Burdens.
Their concern is specific. If the final rule prevents Covered Entities from confirming that a patient actually authorized a third-party application to receive Protected Health Information (PHI), and treats an IAL2 credential as sufficient on its own, providers may lose the ability to catch fraudulent or mismatched requests. The coalition argues this would exceed what the original Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) clearly signaled.
Timeline
- Final days of the first Trump Administration: OCR issues the NPRM.
- Biden administration: OCR collects comments; the proposal stalls.
- President Trump's second term: OCR revives the rulemaking.
- August 2026: The final rule is scheduled for release.
- This week (per the November 2026 report): The CHIME-led coalition sends its letter. OCR has stated only that a final rule is a regulatory priority and has given no firmer date.
Potential Control Failures
The coalition's core argument is that three functions are being collapsed into one: identity proofing, patient matching, and verification of authority. These are analytically and operationally distinct. If a rule treats IAL2 as covering all three, gaps open up.
Identity Proofing Only: An IAL2 credential gives reasonable assurance that the person is who they claim to be. It doesn't indicate which medical record belongs to them.
Uncontrolled Patient Matching: A verified identity still needs to be tied to the correct record. A mismatch here results in a misdirected disclosure of PHI, even if the credential was legitimate.
Disappearing Authority Verification: The coalition notes that an IAL2 credential doesn't establish the nature, scope, duration, or validity of the patient's authorization to a third-party application. Without a way to confirm that, a provider may release data under an authorization that is expired, narrower than the request, or never given.
Loss of Provider Discretion: The coalition asks OCR to preserve the ability to take reasonable, risk-appropriate steps, including confirming authorization directly with the patient when appropriate. A categorical prohibition would remove that safeguard.
Relevant Standards and Requirements
Map the exposure to existing obligations, as these don't change with the rulemaking.
HIPAA Privacy Rule, Verification: 45 CFR 164.514(h) requires Covered Entities to verify the identity of a person requesting PHI and their authority to receive it, where that identity and authority aren't already known. The coalition's argument tracks this distinction.
HIPAA Privacy Rule, Right of Access: 45 CFR 164.524 governs individual access and directing copies to third parties. The tension is that the rule also prohibits unreasonable verification measures, so the debate is about where "reasonable" ends.
HIPAA Security Rule, Person or Entity Authentication: 45 CFR 164.312(d) is a Required Specification: implement procedures to verify that a person or entity seeking access to Electronic Protected Health Information (ePHI) is the one claimed. Authentication here is an ongoing technical safeguard, not a one-time credential check.
Breach Notification Rule: A disclosure to the wrong party is presumed to be a breach unless a risk assessment shows a low probability of compromise. A matching error or a fraudulent authorization claim triggers that analysis regardless of whether the provider followed a prescribed verification path.
NIST SP 800-66: Its guidance on implementing the Security Rule supports risk-based authentication decisions, which is the posture the coalition wants preserved. NIST SP 800-66
Action Items for Your Team
The rule isn't final, so treat this as scenario planning. A Covered Entity or Business Associate that waits for the final text will be redesigning workflows under deadline pressure.
Document Your Three-Layer Verification Model Now: Write down, separately, how you prove identity, match to a record, and confirm authority. If your current process blends them, find out where.
Audit Your Patient-Matching Error Handling: Know what happens when a verified identity maps to an ambiguous or incorrect record. Define who investigates and how it feeds your Breach Notification Rule risk assessment.
Define Your Authorization Confirmation Criteria: Decide which requests warrant direct confirmation with the patient and what risk factors trigger it. A written, risk-based policy is your best defense under either outcome: it supports "reasonable" if OCR permits confirmation, and it shows good faith if OCR restricts it.
Map Third-Party Application Flows in Your Risk Analysis: Update your Security Rule risk analysis to include app-initiated requests as a distinct threat pathway, with authentication and authorization controls identified.
Review Vendor and Partner Contracts: If you're a Business Associate or a life-sciences firm integrating with patient-directed apps, check who bears verification responsibility and who bears liability for a misdirected disclosure.
Prepare a Comment-Period Response: The coalition asked for an additional notice and comment period if OCR departs from the NPRM, or failing that, explicit enforcement protections for providers acting in good faith. Decide whether your organization will file comments or support a trade association that does.
Track OCR Guidance on "Unreasonable" Barriers: The coalition also asked for concrete examples separating unreasonable verification barriers from legitimate safeguards. When examples appear, test your current practices against them line by line.
The goal isn't to oppose patient access. It's to ensure access doesn't outrun your ability to confirm who is asking and on whose behalf. If the final rule narrows your discretion, a documented, risk-based verification model lets you comply and still defend your decisions.





